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Introduction 
Even though monetary incentives can be very effective under certain conditions 
(Green and Stokey, 1983, Lazear and Rosen, 1981), it is well known that they 
exhibit limitations for instance under moral hazard or contractual 
incompleteness.  Moreover people may not be driven by financial incentives 
alone but may also have social concerns of some kind.  This paper focuses on one 
important type of social concern that receives vivid attention recently, which is a 
preference people hold over their rank order position in terms of performance 
compared to others.   
Rankings are a very common and prominent feature of workplace environments.  
In car-dealerships rankings are displayed on Walls of Honor in back-offices; 
Economists receive an email once a month by Repec inviting them to see a whole 
list of ranking statistics related to their publications and working papers; 
students are always keen to know how they are placed within their cohort.  
More importantly perhaps, rankings are becoming more prevalent to evaluate 
teachers or medical professionals and consulted to determine the allocation of 
funding – both public but also private in the form of donations – to schools, 
hospitals, or universities.   
The literature about the effect of providing information about rankings on 
performance is still developing.  To study such rank preferences is therefore 
important both theoretically and empirically.   
How people respond to receiving updates about their rank is theoretically 
ambiguous.  Even though it can encourage some to catch up or to excel even 
more, others may be de-motivated or become complacent.  Which behavior 
prevails is thus pre-dominantly an empirical question.  Empirically, however, the 
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challenge is to disentangle the effect of feedback about rankings from purely 
pecuniary interests: do people really care about their rank or do they simply care 
about the monetary benefits that come with it?  
We designed a field experiment on a crowd-sourcing webpage to see how 
people adjust their effort, both along the intensive and the extensive margin, 
when they are given feedback about their place in rankings. In this context, 
rankings explicitly did not affect their current or future compensation.  For the 
purpose of this experiment, workers are recruited via Amazon’s crowd-sourcing 
website Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com).  Crowd-sourcing is an important 
emerging employment phenomenon whereby employees log on to a website to 
select work offered to them online.  The tasks and the work are also conducted 
online and submitted to the employer who pays for their output.  Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk is a platform that allows the posting of such online work and 
facilitates the payment via their servers.  Many jobs on this platform revolve 
around marketing and advertising campaigns where a human input is required to 
analyze and categorize images, to write and edit text, or to enter data thus 
capturing a large proportion of routine office work.   
For the experiment, job advertisements are placed online on the job listings of 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and workers were recruited to analyze images.  
Workers were paid a piece-rate for the quantity of their work irrespectively of its 
quality.  The key treatment was to randomize employees into two groups.  One 
group received feedback about how they rank in terms of performance of their 
work. The other group received no feedback about their rank.   
Three main results emerge. First, comparing the behavior between the control 
and the treatment group, those who receive feedback are 30% less likely to 
return to work. Second, the productivity of those who were told their rank after 
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they return is 22% lower compared to those who returned to work but were not 
told their rank. Third, we explored heterogeneous treatment effects along a 
number of observable characteristics such as, age, prior ranking, self-reported 
rank preference and whether they received exceptionally high or low ranking 
feedback but find no heterogeneous treatment effects using these proxies.  
Those with self-reported or with revealed preference for rank feedback also did 
not show a differential treatment effect.  We did however find some evidence 
that telling people that they were in the Top 10 did not significantly reduce their 
performance.  
Building on insights in sociology and social psychology there is now a rich theory 
in economics on the role of self-image (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, Koszegi, 
2006), social status(e.g. Robson, 1992, Becker et al, 2005 Ellingsen and 
Johannesson, 2007, Frey, 2007, Moldovanu, et al, 2007, Auriol and Renault, 
2008, Besley and Ghatak, 2008, Dur, 2009, Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2010, Ederer 
and Patacconi, 2010), equity theory (Adams, 1965) and identity (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2005). This paper also builds on theoretical work on interim 
performance feedback (Lizzeri et al., 2002, Aoyagi, 2010) that highlights how its 
effect can be heterogeneous across agents but also points out that the 
optimality of feedback hinges on whether agents know their ability and the 
shape of their cost of effort functions (Aoyagi, 2007, Ederer, 2010).  
A meta-analysis of psychology studies about feedback interventions1 covering 
some 131 studies with over 13,000 subjects by Kluger and Denisi (1996) revealed 
that the effect of feedback on performance is very heterogeneous. Even though 
feedback improved performance on average, it reduced performance in one 
third of the surveyed studies.  
                                                        
1
 See also Smither et al., 2005. 
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Given this heterogeneity in response to rankings and in attitudes towards self-
image there is scope to clarify empirically the patterns behind these differences.  
There are a few papers that studied the effect of status and performance 
feedback with field experiments and quasi-experiments. An early paper is 
Greenberg (1988) who has data from a field experiment of 198 employees in an 
insurance under-writing department. The firm renovated offices of that company 
during which employees had to be relocated to other offices. The clever aspect 
of this paper is that this relocation has been random so that employees have 
been moved to offices that correspond to the same, lower, or higher pay-grades. 
Compared to those employees who were relocated to office in line with their 
current pay-grade, those reassigned to higher status offices increased their 
performance whereas those assigned to lower-status offices reduced it. Under 
the perhaps strong assumption that the status of the office has no direct 
productive impact on performance, the effect of the relocations on performance 
can be attributed to the behavioral response to variations in status 
corresponding to each office type.  
The effect of information about relative performance has been studied 
experimentally in the context of electricity consumption (Costa et al, 2010), job 
satisfaction (Card et al, 2010)2, and it speaks to work on interpersonal wage 
comparisons (Cohn et al, 2011). 
Another closely related study from the education context is Azmat and Iriberri 
(2010) who show how relative performance feedback raises high school 
student’s educational attainment using data from a naturally occurring change in 
some Spanish school districts. The interpretation of their results needs, however, 
                                                        
2
 For evidence from event studies without randomized contemporaneous control and treatment 
groups see Bandiera et al (2011b) and Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2010) 
 6 
to be cast within the education context. Feedback in an education setting 
conveys information about ability, and thus resolves an uncertainty about the 
return to effort, and not just about relative performance. Furthermore their 
results may be driven by changes in behavior of the parents rather than the 
students themselves. In contrast to that paper the field experiment described 
here only gives feedback about rank in a setting where employees have full 
information about absolute performance bringing the interpretation more in line 
with self-image and status. 
Rankings are often used to hand out symbolic awards which has been studied by 
Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) who hired students to enter data for three 
weeks as part of a non-governmental organization project. The treatment was to 
honor the best performance publically with a symbolic award. They find that the 
award treatment raises performance by 12%. In their experiment the authors 
left vague vis-à-vis the student what the exact criteria were to determine the 
award winners. The authors argue that the results are due to the status 
conveyed by the award but it may be possible that the award component of the 
task made the job more interesting to the students thus raising their intrinsic 
motivation. 
In a notable and complementary laboratory experiment3, Charness et al (2010) 
study whether people are willing to learn about and to also improve their rank 
when rank conveys no monetary benefits. They find that simply informing 
subjects about their rank increases their performance. Their result is in contrast 
to the findings of this paper but despite the similarity of the set-up there are 
                                                        
3
 Other laboratory experiments involving feedback about rank are Hannan et al (2008), Freeman 
and Gelber (2010), and Kuhnen and Tymula (2011). 
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many differences in the population, the nature of the task, the scope of 
sabotaging each other’s work, and the duration of the experiment.  
In a companion paper to this field experiment, Barankay (2011) replicated the 
main effect of a reduction in performance due to rank feedback. The setting of 
that paper were furniture salespeople who are paid according to a commission 
rate scheme based on their absolute performance. For a given level of sales a 
change in rankings had no impact on sales. He found that those salespeople who 
were informed about their rank sold over 20% less furniture.  
Another closely related field experiment is by Delfgaauw et al. (2010). In their 
study they introduce a tournament, with or without prizes, in a team setting 
among stores of a clothing chain. They find weak overall effects of the 
tournament but show that when the gender of the store-keeper is aligned with 
that of the employees, the tournaments raise performance more. In contrast to 
that work, employees who work in my experiment and are compensated as 
individuals and only the information about rank is experimentally varied. 
A conclusion of my study is that more information is not always better for the 
performance of agents which speaks to results from earlier laboratory 
experiments (Camerer et al, 1989). In a sequence of experiments, Loewenstein 
et al (2006), for instance, document how more information can reduce the 
performance and earnings even when experimental subjects are willing to pay 
for that information. In one of the experiments, a significant number of 
participants pay for information – the solution to a puzzle – that then hurts their 
ability to predict how many others will solve that puzzle. The adverse effect of 
more information also speaks to the concept of curiosity in psychology whereby 
people are in a state of deprivation due to the lack of information. One salient 
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characteristic of curiosity is, however, its tendency to disappoint when satisfied 
(Loewenstein, 1994). 
The result that more information lowers performance may also motivate policies 
based on asymmetric paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Loewenstein et al, 
2007) where an attempt is made to help individuals achieve their own goals, 
which requires protecting them from themselves and from information they 
would seek.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we explain the 
theoretical intuition behind the results. We then describe the context and 
experimental design. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the main 
treatment effect and the mechanism behind. Finally we conclude with a 
discussion of future work. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
To help organize the results of this paper, we set up a stylized framework that is 
inspired by the theoretical literature reviewed above. Suppose salesperson i’s 
payoff contains three components. First, she derives utility from the monetary 
benefit of her effort. This benefit bi(ei) approximates the commission based 
compensation scheme salespeople face and reflects how their effort maps into 
commission payouts. Second, each worker has a convex cost of effort, ci(ei, θi) 
which depends on the worker’s ability θi. In the third element, we assume that 
workers derive utility from the performance rank they have r(bi, b-i), which 
depends on the monetary payout she receives, bi and that of all the other 
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salespeople captured by the vector b-i. This third component of the payoff 
function generates rank incentives.  
Salespeople choose their effort simultaneously to maximize their payoff 
ei* = argmaxei {bi(ei,mi) - ci(ei, θi) + r(bi, b-i)}. 
We assume that the monetary benefit increases in effort, hence ∂bi(ei,mi)/∂ei ≥ 
0, but the marginal benefit from a change in rank ∂r(bi, b-i) )/∂ei can be more 
flexible. It can be positive when people want to be better than others but it can 
be negative when they want to conform to a low performance norm by lowering 
their rank. For completeness, it is also possible that they may only care about 
their monetary payoff for their work bi(ei,mi) - ci(ei, θi) but not about their rank. 
This set-up can now be adjusted to capture the design of the experiment in this 
paper. In our study, we randomize salespeople into two groups. In one group 
people are privately told their rank and in the other group they are not. Those 
who are not told their rank form a belief, based on their information and prior 
experience, about how their effort maps into the ranking and what they 
estimate the other salespeople’s effort to be. Those in the other group, who are 
told their rank, actually go through three stages. First they choose their effort, 
based on a prior belief ri
b of how their effort will map into a rank, second, they 
learn the realization of their rank, i.e. how their effort actually did map into a 
rank, and third they adjust the effort based on the update.  
We can thus classify the reaction to this update into two categories depending 
on how they enter into the salesperson’s payoff. First, the update may be good 
news in the sense that the actual rank was better than their prior belief. Denote 
α(ri, ri
b; ri, > ri
b) to be the marginal change in effort, where α( .; .) is a parameter 
than can be positive or negative. Second, the update may be bad news in the 
sense that the realized rank was less than the prior belief and the marginal 
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change in effort resulting from this is       β(ri, ri
b; ri, > ri
b), where β( .; .) is a 
parameter that again can be positive or negative. There is also a third possibility 
that agents’ update is exactly in line with their prior belief and we normalize 
their effort response then to be zero. 
More generally α( .; .) and β( .; .) could be non-degenerate functions but given 
the sample sizes in our experiment we only have statistical power to estimate a 
parameter and test for its statistical significance. 
We can then distinguish four empirical predictions in the presence of rank 
incentives.  
First, when α( .; .) > 0 there is an encouragement or motivating effect whereby 
agents will try to catch up even though they are told that they fell short of their 
expected rank.  
Second, when α( .; .) < 0 there is a discouragement or demoralization effect 
whereby agents reduce their effort when they learn that they fell short of their 
expected rank. This can have two interpretations. First, learning about a low rank 
may reduce the enjoyment derived from the job and thus reduces the intrinsic 
motivation of the agent. Similarly there is the possibility that agents learn 
something constructive from negative feedback which encourages them to exit 
and to pursue other opportunities.  
Third, β( .; .) > 0 is an acceleration effect, whereby people who are positively 
surprised by the rank they achieved are driven to excel even more.  
Finally, when β( .; .) < 0 there is a complacency effect whereby salespeople who 
learn that they are better ranked than expected slack off. 
Here we presented a very reduced-form representation of these predictions but 
each of these four cases has been derived in the theoretical literatures on self-
image (Benabou and Tirole, 2002, Koszegi, 2006), and interim performance 
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evaluation (Lizzeri et al, 2002, Aoyagi, 2010). They have also been described in 
observational studies about feedback (Kluger and DeNisi, 1996, Smither et al, 
2005). The experiment below was designed to test for the significance and the 
sign of theses parameters and the mechanism behind them. 
The next section discusses the theoretical framework, followed by a description 
of the empirical context.  Then we present the experimental design with the 
results before the paper closes with conclusions.  
 
 
Context 
To shed light on the effect of feedback about the rank order position we 
implemented a sequence of experimental treatments on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk crowd-sourcing webpage (http://www.mturk.com).  As this is a fairly new 
environment for field experiments it worthwhile to give some further details 
about it.  The webpage is a platform for work conducted and submitted online.  
Employers, or requesters in the terminology of Mechanical Turk, post jobs on the 
website’s job listings section.  Each posting contains a title, a short description of 
the job, keywords, and the payment structure of the job.  Typically jobs offer 
piece-rates, but bonuses conditional on a broad range of measures (e.g. 
accuracy, speed or completeness) are very common, which implies that virtually 
any monetary incentive scheme can be implemented.  In the experiment below, 
however, we will only use piece-rates based on the quantity of work.  Workers, 
also called turkers, peruse the list and pick a job on offer.  The number of jobs to 
choose from varies by day and time and currently ranges between 100,000 and 
250,000.  When they select a job, they are led to a new webpage that presents 
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the work to them.  Each of those web-pages are so-called HITs, short for human 
intelligence task.  The computer literacy required is really minimal and it is as 
easy as setting up an account on Amazon itself.  
Most jobs on Mechanical Turk revolve around tasks that are amenable to be split 
into small increments, that can be digitized, and that require a human input.  
This may sound more abstract than it is. A brief investigation of the jobs posted 
by the principal employers on Mechanical Turk reveals that many tasks are those 
that would otherwise be done by in house office personnel such as the analysis 
or documentation of the content of marketing material such as images of 
merchandise, but also the composition or editing of texts for catalogues or 
corporate blogs, the entry of data, and other related task.  4  To be able to earn 
money, workers currently need to have a bank account either in the US or in 
India.5  
A worker can click on a job that leads them to a website, the HIT, where, after 
accepting the job, the worker can do and submit the work.  After, a worker can 
abandon the job or can choose to be lead to the next webpage in the sequence. 
For instance, an employer may ask workers to answer questions relating to a 
number of images. There is but one image per webpage, so workers must 
proceed to another page to do more work.  
                                                        
4
 Amazon’s business model apparently is to offer the software platform for the posting and 
hosting of the jobs and to facilitate the financial transaction between employers and employees. 
Their legal position is that it is the requester that enters the employer-employee relationship and 
not them. This has tax implications that other researchers need to be aware of. Enrolling people 
into experiments on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk means that one is hiring them.  If one is using 
University funds to pay workers, then the treatment of employees is determined by and varies 
according to University human resource departments. Typically there is a yearly income 
threshold below which a full set of paperwork, e.g. W6 and their social security number, is not 
required.  
5
 This is due to the Patriot Act’s money laundering provisions, the requirements of which Amazon 
is currently able to satisfy in the US and in India. 
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 The advantages using Mechanical Turk for field experimental work are manifold. 
First, a central appeal of field experiments is that subjects don’t initially know 
that they are part of an experiment6 and that experiments are conducted in a 
natural environment such as a workplace. Both these criteria are met. 
Furthermore, in contrast to field experiments conducted in collaboration with 
firms (Bandiera et al. 2010b), the experimenter can pose as the firm giving him 
substantial control about the protocol and thereby eliminating many project 
risks relating to field experiments. Also, the timeframe is much shorter to 
conduct experiments on Mechanical Turk: The whole experiment can be 
completed in a couple of hours, yet one retains the flexibility to implement long-
term experiments as well.7 Finally, the costs of running experiments can be low 
but one has to factor in the programming costs which depending on the 
experimental set-up can be substantial.  
There are, however, two very appealing aspects about Mechanical Turk. First, as 
will be shown in the next section, it allows a very neat study of the extensive 
margin. Second, the characteristics of workers are much broader than can be 
found in most companies or laboratories. Table 1 displays data from a survey 
conducted among the workers enrolled into this paper’s jobs after the 
completion of experiments. Roughly over half of the workers are female, and the 
                                                        
6
 Institutional review board requirements vary across universities in order to obtain a waiver of 
written consent by human research subjects that would inform them that they participate in an 
experiment. Usually these requirements are that the purpose of the job needs to be stated (e.g. 
University research), a contact person needs to be available, that the task poses no more than 
minimal risk, and that they will be debriefed at the end. All these conditions can be met on 
Mechanical Turk. 
7 This contrasts very favorably with field experiments conducted in collaboration with firms 
where it takes at least one year but typically closer to two years from initial meetings to the 
completion of the experiments. There is no hard data on completion rates but my perception 
is that only a fifth of field experiments that actually get under way also reach the final 
experimental stage. 
 14 
age range is younger compared to the overall population, which explains also the 
somewhat lower educational attainment. The self-reported income range is 
lower than in the overall population but is also very broad. The intensity with 
which these people work on Mechanical Turk reflects that some workers do this 
alongside their main job, but some spend a good part of the week on Mechanical 
Turk: It takes workers between 30-60 seconds per HIT so that the1000 HITs take 
them 8 – 17 hours per week. The risk attitudes and patience are not far from 
those found in larger samples. The key point is that while the people who work 
on Mechanical Turk are by no means representative of the overall population, 
they are not particularly remarkable in terms of characteristics.8  
Any experiment or indeed any empirical study faces the challenge of external 
validity, and this setting is no exception. To have a meaningful discussion on 
external validity, one first has to define the population of interest and then, if 
the population of interest is different from that in the sample, how that may bias 
the results. Clearly people who work on Mechanical Turk are special by the 
simple fact that they choose work there. But based on the survey results, they 
don’t strike us as unusual in other aspects. 
                                                        
8 Moreover, it is noteworthy, although not done in this paper, that given this broad range of 
characteristics, one could aim to implement experiments with subjects that are otherwise 
hard to recruit in laboratories or typically underrepresented in companies, e.g. single 
mothers, or people over 65. This is important for replication studies or for studies requiring 
such detailed subject pools. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of workers participating in the experiments (n = 227) 
Gender: 54.18% female 
Age 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 65+ 
Frequ. 14.1% 16.7% 19.4% 12.8% 6.6% 8.4% 9.3% 6.2% 4% 2% 0.4% 
 
Education Some 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
Associates 
degree 
Bachelor’s 
Degree  
Master’s 
Degree 
Doctorate 
Frequ. 2% 12% 29% 15% 28% 12% 1% 
 
Income 
in 2009 
<$10K $10K-
15K 
$15K-
25K 
$25K-
40K 
$40k-
60K 
$60K-
75K 
$75K-
100K 
$100K-
150K 
$150K-
200K 
$200k-
250K 
Frequ. 26% 11% 11% 22% 16% 4% 5% 4% 1% 1% 
Experience  
“Over the last month how many HITs did you submit on average per week?” 
1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500-1000 1000-4999 
9% 7% 10% 15% 15% 19% 9% 10% 6% 
“For how long have you been active on Mechanical Turk?” 
0-3 months 3-6 months 6-12 months 1-2 years 2years+ 
73% 9% 9% 6% 4% 
Risk
9
 - Zero means: "not prepared to take risks" and 10 means: "fully prepared to take risks." 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2% 1% 4% 9% 11% 20% 15% 18% 13% 4% 5% 
Patience
10
 
Very impatient Somewhat patient Neither Somewhat patient Very patient 
2% 25% 10% 42% 22% 
                                                        
9 The wording of the question was “How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person 
who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you avoid taking risks? (Please choose a number 
from 0 to 10 where 0 means: "not prepared to take risks" and the value 10 means: "fully 
prepared to take risks.")” 
10 The wording of the question was “How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person 
who is patient or impatient? 
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Experimental Design 
For the purpose of these experiments we posted jobs on Mechanical Turk that 
are very similar to other jobs encountered on Mechanical Turk in terms of 
difficulty, pay,11 prior experience needed, and time. We also wanted to make 
sure that some elements of the tasks require real human effort. 
We posted jobs in which people had to answer four questions relating to a 
picture. Figure 1 gives an example of a picture. The pictures are of walls and 
pavements on and around the campus of the University of Pennsylvania. The 
four questions are, (i) whether the picture is in focus, (ii) whether there are any 
clear cracks of lines in the picture, (iii) what the total sum of the length of lines in 
% of the width of the picture is, and (iv) to assess the overall quality of the 
picture. The precise wording of the questions is given in the Appendix. We 
offered a $0.05 piece-rate when they answered the four questions relating to 
each picture. It is important to note that payment was independent of quality, 
which we communicated to workers at various stages in the experiment. In 
additional we paid them between the experimental stages so that they knew 
that pay only depended on the quantity worked and not the quality. When 
designing this job it was of key importance to keep its appearance in line with 
what these workers were used to. Even though this job may seem abstract, 
                                                        
11 As experiments on Mechanical Turk become more common the payment practices become a 
point of contention. Browsing the Mechanical Turk webpage one encounters many jobs with very 
low pay. No comprehensive data exist on how popular those jobs are. It is true that one could do 
jobs very cheaply but that would limit the external validity of the results. An aim in this study was 
to offer pay where it was under plausible conditions a worker could earn the minimum wage. 
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uninteresting or even of questionable use,12 it is very comparable to other jobs 
on Mechanical Turk and perhaps even of some office work. 
The experiment proceeded in several stages.  
 
Stage 1: Eliciting revealed and stated preferences for feedback about rank 
In the first stage of the experiment we wanted to elicit preferences for feedback 
about the rank order position. This was important for three reasons. First, it is 
often stated that people want to know how they rank. This has been the 
principal stimulus to the status and the rank literature. So it is useful to establish 
if this is empirically the case. Second, we wanted to know if giving feedback 
about rank affected workers differently depending on whether they had a stated 
or revealed preference for rank feedback. Third, we will use the revealed 
preference for rank as indicative of the fact the workers care about their rank.13 
We posted two jobs simultaneously on Mechanical Turk. These two jobs were 
entirely identical except only for the title of the job. The first job had the title 
“Answer four questions relating to a picture. No typing required.” The second 
job had the title “Answer four questions relating to a picture and get feedback 
on your rank in terms of accuracy. No typing required.” 
                                                        
12
 In the survey to workers we asked them why they chose to work for us. 24% said the pay was 
good, 43% said that the work looked interesting, 9% stated the work looked fun, and 23% chose 
that the work looked easy. 
13 It has also been attempted to ask the workers directly what their reference point is and 
whether and in what way they cared about being better or worse than their reference point. 
Validating pre-testing those questions revealed a number of problems of framing and 
misinterpretation of the question. We therefore chose a more reliable yet limited approach of 
asking them whether they like to get feedback about their rank order position. 
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Treatment Effects 
The effect of offering feedback on job selection 
Faced with that choice, the surprising result is that the first job without the 
feedback was substantially more popular. During the time we posted the jobs,14 
the no feedback job attracted 254 workers compared to 76 workers who chose 
the job with feedback. So when workers are offered a choice between two 
identical jobs but one with rank feedback and the other without, we cannot 
confirm the prior that there is a strong demand for rank feedback. It is important 
to note for what follows that at this stage of the experiment none of the workers 
received feedback – who receives feedback will actually be randomized in the 
next step. 
As noted above, we administered a survey to workers after all experimental 
treatments. In other studies is has been shown how simply asking people about 
their preference has strong predictive power for their revealed preferences via 
actions. As there was little guidance in the literature as to whether it is necessary 
to get data on revealed preference for rank or whether simply asking about their 
preferences is enough, we wanted to get data on both to see what the 
correlation between stated and revealed preferences is. In the worker, survey 
we thus asked several questions about rank feedback. When asked how much 
they agree or disagree with the statement “*y+ou want to receive feedback about 
your relative performance, i.e. how your performance ranked compared to 
others”, 44% answered strongly agree, 31% agree somewhat, 17% neither agree 
or disagree, 6% disagree somewhat, and 2% selected strongly disagree. So there 
is already strong discrepancy between stated and revealed preferences. 
                                                        
14
 The jobs were posted twice for 24 hours each on different days to deal with potential day of 
week effects.  
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Whereas a 74% majority stated they want rank feedback, only a 23% minority 
actually chose the job where feedback was offered. 
Next we can investigate the correlation between stated and revealed 
preferences. The correlation between the survey response of 227 workers15 and 
which job the worker chose is only 0.0308. 
Clearly, the stated and revealed preferences are almost orthogonal to each 
other. One could say that this low correlation may be specific to the job at hand 
or the wording of the survey question. Yet it would be hard to imagine that noise 
and framing alone could bias a true relationship by that much.16 One lesson here 
is that data on revealed preference adds information over and above stated 
preference for feedback about rank. In the appendix we explore with logistic 
regressions which workers chooses the feedback over the no feedback job and 
how that selection affected subsequent performance.  
In summary, the job without feedback was much more popular among the 
workers. We fail to predict, based on observable characteristics, which type of 
worker chooses the feedback rather than the no rank feedback job. Finally there 
is no discernable selection effect across workers that lead to a difference in the 
productivity of workers. One final note is that at the end of this stage we paid 
workers for any and all the work they did irrespective of the accuracy of the 
work. They knew, therefore, that compensation did not depend on the quality – 
the accuracy – of their work. 
 
                                                        
15 We checked whether the survey respondents were a selected sample but, based on 
observable we find no evidence for a bias. Details are available upon request from the author. 
16 This result however is perhaps in line with a casual observation among students for: they 
have a keen interest to get feedback about how their performance ranks compared to others 
but have a rather strong emotional response when they are given feedback about their rank. 
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Stage 2: Giving workers feedback about their rank in terms of accuracy 
In the next stage of the experiment we block-randomized workers into two 
groups to determine who was given feedback about their rank order position.  
More specifically we took half the workers who chose the no feedback job in the 
first stage and half the workers who chose the rank feedback job and allocated 
them to a control group leaving the other half in the treatment group. 
We then sent an email to all those workers via the Mechanical Turk messaging 
system. The 142 workers in the control group (without rank feedback in email) 
received an email inviting them to come back again to do more work for us. In 
the email we informed them that all workers were sent this email and that 
ranking was not relevant for compensation, as we wanted to make sure they 
don’t feel selected in any way beyond the fact that they worked for us before.17 
The appendix gives the exact wording of the emails. The 142 workers in the 
treatment group (with rank feedback in email) received the same invitation, but 
in that email we informed them about their rank in terms of accuracy of their 
answers compared to others. No other element was different across the two 
groups, e.g. the pay and any aspect of the work they were asked to do was 
identical.  
 
Main treatment effect of rank feedback on the intensive and extensive margin 
We can now study whether giving people feedback about rank affects on 
average their extensive margin – in our context whether people come back to do 
                                                        
17 Mechanical Turk allows employers to give out qualifications to individual workers. In this 
stage of the experiments we qualified the workers to do more work for us and only these 
qualified workers could work in this stage of the experiment. Just to be clear all the workers 
who participated in the first stage of the experiment were sent emails and invited to 
participate in the second stage. 
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more work when invited to do so – and the intensive margin, the quantity and 
the quality of their work conditional on coming back to work. 
Of the 142 workers in the control group (without rank feedback in email), 88 
(62%) returned to do more work. In the treatment group (with rank feedback in 
email) only 59 returned to work (42%). Thus providing feedback substantially 
reduces the extensive margin. This is also confirmed in logistic regressions in 
column 1 of Table 2. 
We can also study the intensive margin here by measuring the number of 
pictures done by those people.  This is interesting for a specific reason: it may be 
the case that sending people might dissuade some workers to come back to 
work but might help to attract back high performing workers. This is, however, 
not that case. On average, those who received feedback about their rank order 
position were 22% less productive conditional on returning to work. Those who 
received no information about their rank in the invitation email completed on 
average 19.6 pictures compared to 15.3 pictures by those who did receive 
feedback about their rank in the invitation email. Column 1 of Table 3 confirms 
this result in a regression model.18 
 
Heterogeneous treatment effects of feedback on the intensive and the extensive 
margin 
We now turn to explore heterogeneous treatment effects. As highlighted in the 
theoretical section, whether people increase or reduce their effort depends on a 
number of underlying conditions and parameters especially on whether the 
                                                        
18 One could also use hurdle models to jointly estimate the extensive and the intensive margin.  
Using simple regression models conveys the result in a more accessible way. Hurdle models 
generate qualitatively the same results. 
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update is positive or negative. As was shown above observable characteristics do 
not predict whether workers have a preference to get feedback.19  
Finally we take the model more seriously and see if those with a revealed 
preference for rank and those with a positive or a negative update compared to 
their prior belief about their rank raise or lower their effort after the update. As 
we highlighted in the model it is among these workers that we should expect an 
effort response: those who don’t care about rank should not change their 
behavior in light of feedback about their rank if it does not affect their 
compensation; those who get feedback that is in line with their prior also won’t 
update their behavior as the feedback contains no new information.  
It is very difficult to have an independent measure of whether people care about 
their rank, what their reference point is, and what their prior belief about their 
rank is. Yet, we made some first attempts into this direction that should inspire 
further exploration to better elicit these important underlying parameters.  
In this paper we attempted to approach this challenge in the following way. We 
measure the preference over rank by whether workers chose the feedback job in 
stage 1 or by whether they have a stated preference for feedback.20 As this could 
proxy for a general propensity to work more it is important to control for the 
main along with the interaction effect. In column II of Table 2 we added these 
variable and also interacted them with the treatment dummy. We find no 
evidence that either having a stated or a revealed preference for feedback about 
                                                        
19
 See the Appendix and in particular Tabel A1 for further details. 
20 As explained above we tried in pre-tests other ways to get a more direct measure of their 
reference points and whether they (dis-)like to be ahead or behind their reference point. 
Subjects were however confused by what was being asked and also revealed an incentive to 
misreport information in the questionnaire.   
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rank has a significant differential treatment effect.21 This result is also confirmed 
when studying the intensive margin. In Table 3 column 3 we test if these 
preference terms had a differential treatment effect on the quantity worked but 
find no evidence for it.  
We finally attempt to estimate the effect of getting an unexpectedly positive 
feedback about rank performance.  In terms of the model this refers to the case 
when the update about the rank order position is higher than the prior belief.  As 
we have no good data about prior beliefs we make the following proxy. We 
create a dummy variable equal to one when a worker appeared in the Top 10 in 
any of the four accuracy rankings.22  
In column III of Table 2 we see that the interaction term between rank feedback 
and Top 10 performance is not significant.  One can do one final test here to see 
to see if giving positive feedback is less destructive to performance than giving 
feedback irrespective of performance.  For this we do a joint test if the sum of 
the coefficients on Rank Feedback plus (Top 10 Performance)*(Rank Feedback) is 
significantly different from zero. We fail to reject the null that the sum of these 
coefficients is equal to zero (

2(1)  0.63, p-value 0.4281). 
We can confirm the same results as we study the intensive margin in column III 
of Table 3. Again the interaction term on Top 10 performance and Rank Feedback 
is not significantly different from zero but the join test of whether the sum of the 
                                                        
21
 We also ran regressions adding only the main and interaction effects of the stated preference 
or only for the revealed preference with qualitatively the same result. 
22
 As this could measure ability it is important to control for the main along with the interaction 
effect. This variable is equal to one when a person appeared in any of the four accuracy rankings 
within the top 10. We experimented with a number of different definitions for this variable all 
yielding the same qualitative results notable. We tried whether people are in the top and/or the 
bottom 25 in terms of ranking; if they were in the top or the bottom 10% or 25% in the accuracy 
performance distribution; and broke down the results by the ranking on each of the four 
categories. 
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coefficients on Rank Feedback plus (Top 10 Performance)*(Rank Feedback) is 
equal to zero can not be rejected (F(1, 143)= 0.77, p-value 0.3805).  
Taken together, although we find that giving feedback about rank reduces 
performance both on the intensive and the extensive margin we at least find 
that giving unexpectedly positive feedback (i.e. telling workers that they are in 
the Top 10) does not significantly reduce performance.  One should be cautious 
in interpreting this last result but it suggests that feedback does not always 
reduce performance.  
As mentioned before these metrics are not perfect but struck us as the right 
balance at this stage. Future research should further explore the correct 
measurement of reference points and preferences parameters more precisely 
perhaps with incentivized revelation mechanisms. 
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Table 2: Effect of feedback about rank order position on the extensive margin 
Dependent variable is equal to 
one when person returns to 
do more work after being sent 
an invitation email 
 
(I) 
Baseline 
(II) 
Rank 
Preference 
(III) 
Top 10 news 
Rank Feedback  -0.8297*** 
(.2449) 
-.2649 
(.7788) 
-1.132*** 
(.3021) 
 
 Revealed Rank Preference  0.7214 
(1.151) 
 
 
(Revealed Rank Preference)* 
(Rank Feedback)  
 -1.282 
(1.269) 
 
 
Stated Rank Preference  -.0941 
(.2447) 
 
 
(Stated Rank Preference)* 
(Rank Feedback) 
 -.2571 
(.3581) 
 
 
Top 10 performance   -2.069 
(.4190) 
 
(Top 10 performance)* 
(Rank Feedback)  
  .7196 
(.6293) 
 
Number of observations 284 191 284 
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.074 0.131 
Notes: These are logistic regressions in which the estimated coefficients are reported (rather than odd 
ratios) with bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications.  The data is on all workers who worked in 
the first stage of the experiment who were then sent one of the two email. See the appendix for the precise 
wording of the emails. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to unity when the worker chose 
to return to work after the email. Rank Feedback is the treatment index variable equal to unity when the 
invitation email contained feedback about rank order position in terms of the accuracy of their work; the 
control group received and email without rank information.  The sample in column 2 and 3 is somewhat 
smaller as it uses data from the worker survey. Revealed Rank Preference  is equal to one when a worker 
chose the job with offered feedback in the first stage of the experiment. Stated Rank Preference is equal to 
one when a worker confirmed in the survey to like getting feedback about their rank Top 10 performance is 
equal to one when a worker has been ranked among the Top 10 along any of the four accuracy measures. 
See the Appendix and the text for further details and definition of variables. 
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Table 3: Effect of feedback about rank order position on the intensive margin 
Dependent variable measures 
the quanity worked 
conditional on returning to 
work in the second stage. 
 
(I) 
Baseline 
(II) 
Rank 
Preference 
(III) 
Top 10 news 
Rank Feedback  -4.275** 
(1.688) 
-7.920** 
(3.927) 
-4.238*** 
(1.645) 
 
 Revealed Rank Preference  0.6739 
(1.976) 
 
 
(Revealed Rank Preference)* 
(Rank Feedback)  
 3.736 
(4.124) 
 
 
Stated Rank Preference  -1.887** 
(.8709) 
 
 
(Stated Rank Preference)* 
(Rank Feedback) 
 0.9217 
(1.974) 
 
 
Top 10 performance   -14.70*** 
(2.635) 
 
(Top 10 performance)* 
(Rank Feedback)  
  1.321 
(3.700) 
 
Number of observations 147 121 147 
R2 0.0457 0.1038 0.3008 
Notes:  The data used in these regressions is based on those workers who return to work after being send 
an invitation email at the start of the second stage.  All workers who worked in the first stage of the 
experiment were then sent one of the two emails. See the appendix for the precise wording of the emails. 
The dependent variable measures the number images completed by a worker.  These are OLS regressions 
with robust standard errors. Using count data regressions generates qualitatively the same results.  See 
Table 2 for further information about the definitions of the variables. 
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Conclusions 
There is a growing literature both theoretically and experimental that studies whether 
people derive a utility from their rank. These behavioral patterns are very interesting for 
contract and policy design as they could potentially elicit effort when monetary 
incentives cause unintended consequences or are ineffective. Following a prior 
literature on social psychology we aimed to provide evidence from a field experiment 
using a crowd-sourcing webpage on how effort changes of workers both along the 
intensive and the extensive margin when they are told their performance rank. We find 
that telling people their rank reduces both the intensive and the extensive margin in a 
context where rank had no bearing on their current or future compensation.  
This paper complements other laboratory and field experimental studies. One particular 
contribution is to show the impact of rank feedback on the extensive margin, i.e. 
differential attrition. In many laboratory studies, subjects can only respond along the 
intensive margin, i.e. productivity, and thus the results may differ is attrition would be 
permitted. 
Studying social preferences in general and rank preferences in particular is important for 
several reasons.  First it is a more realistic representation of human concerns and 
behavior in the workplace.  Second, it received a lot of attention in education and health 
policy without much prior empirical investigation.  Third, rank incentives could be 
potential candidates for behavioral incentive schemes to shape habit formation. 
One can derive two general policy prescriptions from this study.  
The first lesson is that if we are to envisage behavioral incentive schemes based on rank 
feedback it is imperative to elicit whether people are prone to complacency and 
demoralization effects, as was the case in our context, or whether they will respond 
positively to rank feedback.  
The second lesson, and a suggestion for future work, is to see if there exists an 
alternative framing of rank feedback that will elicit a more positive productivity 
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response from the one we used in this study. Possible candidates here could be to 
attach rank information to goals and benchmarks. Also, public instead of private 
feedback about rank may be able to elicit a different response.  
Given the large behavioral response generated by such a trivial and cost-effective 
intervention it seems a fruitful area for more field experiments.  
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Figure 1: Example of a picture 
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Appendix 
Job Descriptions 
Title as it appears on the Mechanical Turk job listing:  
Job 1: “Answer four questions relating to a picture. No typing required.” 
Job 2: “Answer four questions relating to a picture and get feedback on your rank in 
terms of accuracy. No typing required.” 
Further description on the webpage with the work (HIT) itself: 
“To improve our database as part of an environmental university research project, 
please answer the following questions relating to the picture below. There is no need to 
type. Simply select your answers by clicking on a radio button. The quality of your 
answers is very important to us. We greatly appreciate the diligence you devote to this 
task.” 
 
Wording of the questions in the jobs 
Questions workers were asked to answer the following four questions: 
Question 1. Is the picture sharp and in focus?  
A1 ALL parts of the picture are sharp and in focus. 
A2 SOME parts of the picture are sharp and in focus. 
A3 NO part of the picture is sharp and in focus. 
A4 Don't Know/Can't tell. 
 
Question 2. Can you see any clear cracks or lines in the picture?  
A1 Yes 
A2 No 
A3 Don't Know/Can't tell. 
 
Question 3. We want to know how long, in total, the lines or cracks are. What is the 
TOTAL sum of all lines or cracks on the picture as compared to the WIDTH of the 
picture? When there are several cracks of lines add them up and then compare that 
total length to the width of the picture. Note: The width measures the extent of the 
pictures from left to right. Example: When the sum of all lines is less than a quarter of 
the pictures width it is less than 25% of the picture's width.  
The sum of all crack or lines are... 
A1 …less than 25% of the picture's width.  
A2 …25% to 50% of the picture's width.  
A3 …50% to 75% of the picture's width. 
A4 …50% to 75% of the picture's width. 
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A5 …75% to 100% of the picture's width. 
A6 …100% to 150% of the picture's width. 
A7 …more than 150 
A8 Don’t know/Can’t tell 
A9 There are no lines or cracks 
 
Question 4. The overall quality of the pictures in our data-base is very important to us. 
How would you rate the overall quality of the picture? Note: Please try to ignore the 
sharpness of the picture when judging the overall quality.  
A1 Well Below Average 
A2 Below Average 
A3 Average 
A4 Above Average 
A5 Well Above Average 
A6 Don't know/Can't tell 
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Further evidence on selection into the feedback and the no feedback job 
Table A1 explores with logistic regressions with reported coefficients whether survey 
based characteristics help predict the attributes of worker who choose the feedback 
job. Thus basic demographic characteristics do not differ across the two groups thus not 
inducing a selection bias along those dimensions. We can also confirm in this logistic 
estimation that the stated preference for feedback holds no predictive power for the 
revealed preference for feedback. 
 
 
 
Table A1: Who chooses the rank feedback job? 
Logistic regressions with the dependent variable equal to one when a worker chose the feedback 
job in the first stage of the experiment. See notes below for further details. 
 
Female   -.0516  (.3534) 
Age     .0154  (.0134) 
High education  -.5534  (.3407) 
Experience  -.0001  (.0003) 
Risk    .0089  (.0824) 
Patience   -.1869  (.3487) 
Likes rank feedback .0345  (.1623) 
Number of observations 227 
Pseudo R
2
  .0196 
Note: Logistic regressions with estimated coefficients. Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 
replications. High education is a dummy equal to unity when a worker has at least a completed 
high school; coding this variable differently does not alter the result. Experience is the level of 
experience the worker has on Mechanical Turk. Risk is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
person stated to be risk loving in the survey. Patience is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
person stated to be patient in the survey. Likes rank feedback is a dummy variable equal to one 
when the person agreed to the statement in the survey “*y+ou want to receive feedback about 
your relative performance, i.e. how your performance ranked compared to others”.  
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Next, one can explore a possible selection effect by looking at whether the quantity or 
the quality of work was any different between those who chose the feedback job and 
those who chose the no feedback job. Quantity is simply measured by the number of 
pictures done by a worker. In the no feedback job workers did on average 21 pictures 
and in the feedback job they did 23 pictures, which is not significantly different at the 
5% level. Quality is measured by the fraction of question that the worker answers 
accurately. Note that the first three questions (whether the picture is in focus; whether 
it contains a crack or line; and how long the crack is) the correct answer can be 
objectively determined. We find no evidence for a difference in terms of accuracy in the 
work done for the feedback and the no feedback job.  
 
Table A2: Accuracy of work in the feedback and in the no feedback job 
    No rank feedback With rank feedback 
Is the picture in focus?  .75 (.15)   .76 (.15) 
Is there are a line/crack?  .78 (.21)   .79 (.22) 
How long is the line/crack? .43 (.20)   .45 (.19) 
Note: Each cell gives the fraction of all questions that was answered correctly. See the appendix 
for the complete wording of the questions and possible answers. Based on data from 254 
workers who chose the no rank feedback job and the 76 workers who chose the job where we 
offered rank feedback. 
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Wording of the email sent to the workers at the beginning of the second stage of the 
experiment 
Email sent to workers in the control group 
“Hi, 
We greatly appreciate the work you did for us recently.  
Thank you for completing the assignment on Mechanical Turk for us. We would like you 
to answer a set of HITs similar to the ones you have already answered. Please go to the 
link provide below, after logging into Mturk.com, where we assigned a HIT for you. 
Note: All workers who worked on these HITs were given this qualification. 
 
*URL to the job+” 
 
Email sent to workers in the control group 
“Hi, 
We greatly appreciate the work you did for us recently. Here is a feedback of your work.  
You were ranked ww out of WWW workers in terms of accuracy on the first question. 
You were ranked xx out of XXX workers in terms of accuracy on the second question. 
You were ranked yy out of YYY workers in terms of accuracy on the third question. 
You were ranked ZZ out of ZZZ workers in terms of accuracy on the fourth question. 
  Thank you for completing the assignment on Mechanical Turk for us. We would like 
you to answer a set of HITs similar to the ones you have already answered. Please go to 
the link provide below, after logging into Mturk.com, where we assigned a HIT for you. 
Note: All workers who worked on these HITs were given this qualification. 
 
[URL to the job+” 
 
 
 
